On Saturday March 11, 2023, members and guests gathered in person for the first time since 2019 for four papers on the theme of ‘Understanding Russia?’ with lectures focusing on Russia’s autocratic tradition, imperial expansion, Stalin and the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR. The wide-ranging programme served to pose a range of questions for a large audience of students, building on material they had explored as part of their GCSE and Sixth Form courses.
Professor Jonathan Davis of Anglia Ruskin University spoke on the topic of ‘Stalin the 1930s: builder and destroyer.’ Stalin’s inheritance from Lenin was that of a war-torn ‘backward’ country where the image of a communist utopia seemed very distant; yet by the time of his death, the USSR was an industrial giant. As Isaac Deutscher argued, ‘Stalin found Russia with a wooden plough and left it with a nuclear bomb.’ Stalin recognised the critical importance of both economic and cultural revolution. Yet how were these goals to be achieved? Initial steps to promote agricultural recovery stemmed from the NEP and there were wider attempts to drive social and cultural reform growth; greater opportunities for women were provided through Zhenotdel, whilst more broadly, there were attempts to raise educational levels. Nevertheless, the economy did not embrace collectivist ideals, a legacy of NEP, consequently, Stalin turned towards industrialization and collectivization in his attempt to advance towards socialism. Stalin’s particular focus on raising production, one central to soviet ideals and practice, constitutes the key to understanding Leninist, Stalinist, and post-Stalinist practices. However, in many respects, the system neglected issues of wider popular welfare in the drive towards modernity and security. Stalin emphasized the importance of tempo- ‘We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we go under’ (Stalin 1931). Professor Davis placed weight on the vital role of corrective labour camps and laws. Nevertheless, in spite of these horrors, it is important to recognise some of the successes of the Stalinist system. The city of Magnitogorsk, founded in 1929, became a beacon of hope for many Soviet people, one which marked a notable contrast with the unemployment in the West. Moscow itself became a showcase city, where rapid urbanisation, social mobility and educational opportunity reached levels unthinkable under the Tsars. Even luxury items like chocolate and champagne were available, with over 12 million bottles of the latter being produced during the war years, a reflection of democratic luxury. Yet while Stalin may be viewed as a builder, he was also a destroyer. The focus on heavy industry, particularly in the first and the second five-year plans and the attack on the peasantry through collectivization led to untold misery. Famine, alongside cultural and religious erosion, contributed to the alienation of the peasantry from a profoundly coercive regime. Whereas Lenin had sought an alliance with peasants and workers through the NEP, Stalin chose a radically different path. Thus, Stalin can be seen as both builder and destroyer; he drove modernity, albeit in a very Russian way.
Professor Davis’s second lecture examined Russia’s troubled transition from communism to capitalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and explored key turning points away from a potential path to democracy. To understand Russia today, it is essential to trace change over the past thirty years, a time shared both by the collapse of the USSR and the development of post-Soviet space. Between 1991-99, Boris Yeltsin faced the enormous challenge of transition, one of establishing a market-based liberal democracy in Russia. Yeltsin introduced shock therapy in an attempt to create a market economy, the speed of his reforms proving highly destabilising and contributing to a subsequent breakdown of order which further diminished faith in his government. Professor Davis highlighted the significance of the growth of Gazprom to which over 5 million people owed their employment, and the emergence of a new Russian nouveau riche class. Yet whilst economic liberalisation led to the growth of the oligarchs, wealth did not even begin to ‘trickle down’ society. Frustration at this contributed to a return to tradition and a backlash against the western brands, even McDonalds! Nevertheless, away from domestic chaos, Yeltin proved more successful in integrating Russia back into world politics, continuing Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of ‘New Thinking’ which saw East- West relations improve. On reflection, one might argue that Yeltsin’s problems were furthered by the failure of the West to understand fully the scale of problems Russia was facing.
By contrast, Vladimir Putin has challenged Russia’s democratic framework whilst turning the country away from engaging with Western powers. Putin’s priorities lie in the need to build domestic stability and foster an international image of global respect. He has sought to embed Russian nationalism deeply in the political system and society whilst also driving economic nationalism, a challenge to globalisation. In contrast to Boris Yeltsin, Putin clamped down on the oligarchs, whilst his backing for the Russian Orthodox Church proved popular with older generations who had benefited little from the collapse of the Soviet Union. One notable feature of Putin’s control has been the rehabilitation of Stalin, in itself a reflection of his regime’s authoritarianism. A wider focus on restoring an image of Russian pride and security has been a further factor in the revival of Stalin’s image, with Putin successfully trading on Russia’s past, notably narratives of the Great Patriotic War and Stalin’s success in elevating Russia’s status on the world stage. In this respect, Putin was able to exploit the unstable legacy of Yeltsin, an environment within which he could use Stalin to legitimise his own actions, trade on Russia’s former glories and fuel fears of the West.
Professor Chris Read of Warwick University examined the theme of Russia’s perennial Border Problem: Imperial Expansion or National Defence 1854 to 1964? In an extremely stimulating lecture, Professor Reed sparked deep reflection on themes of change and continuity, contrasting Russia’s historical experience with other powers. To a significant degree, many features of British history reflect a process of continuity. In spite of external threats, intrusion and internal conflict, Britain has maintained key institutions, for instance the monarchy, parliament and a legal system which has its roots in the Middle Ages. Within this context, change has proved gradual. By contrast, the Russian historical tradition has proved markedly different, consisting of sharp, harsh breaks and more limited contrasting periods, leading to stagnation and new catastrophic collapses. Nevertheless, despite these changes, Professor Reed emphasised the shared characteristics of successor states, highlighting themes of centralization, authoritarianism, and a large military. Furthermore, one might also point to economic backwardness and a wider socio-cultural conservatism. Through this approach, Professor Read examined the deep, shaping impulses which cast light on the extraordinary continuity within these processes of catastrophic change.
Our final talk from Professor Read, examined the challenge of understanding the ‘real’ Russia since the 1930s. Drawing on wide -ranging positions, Professor Read explored the never-ending conflict between Russophobes and Russophiles. From this perspective, some outsiders have appeared blind to any fault, ranging from those who praised Stalin and the Soviet Union during the purges to contemporaries who appear to overlook the impact of Putin’s actions today. By contrast, cold war warriors have presented an image of seemingly genetically imprinted evil on everything Russia did and does stand for, attributing to it intrinsic characteristics of barbarism and malevolent imperialism. In this field, moderation and balance may appear to be in very short supply! Professor Read highlighted the dangers of developing an unrepresentative image of Russia, illustrating this through the reporting of a speech in India in March 2023 by Sergei Lavrov where references to the Ukraine war were booed yet a more enthusiastic response to other elements in his presentation was widely ignored, thereby demonstrating the profound dangers of a snapshot gaze. This lack of context is a frequent problem in the representation of Russia, whilst a further challenge lies in the so-called ‘fearful gaze,’ a vision rooted within the totalitarian paradigm of the gulag. Instead, Professor Read emphasised the importance of a mission to understand Russia on her own terms. Rather than simply comparing her negatively with the West, perhaps a fuller understanding can be gained by exploring Russia’s relationships with other nearby powers, for example India or Iran. Through this approach, we may generate more productive questions, and indeed answers, regarding how we observe and understand our world.
The conference closed with the panel responding to a series of stimulating and thought-provoking questions from the audience. Topics explored included comparisons between Lenin and Stalin and the collapse of Tsardom in 1917, themes beloved of A level examiners. Yet there was also much discussion concerning Russia’s future direction and whether it was possible for a western style democratic system to emerge. We extend an enormous thanks to our speakers for their stimulating presentations. The event concluded with lunch at Selwyn College and a tour for interested students.
cambridgehistoryforum.org 